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  European Union, or the European Community (EC) as it continues to be called in the 
WTO parlance, has had the most extensive network of preferential trade areas (PTAs) of any 
WTO member.  Prior to the current wave of PTAs, christened “New Regionalism” by 
Bhagwati (1993), EC was a participant to half of such arrangements.  Thus, according to the 
WTO list current at the time of writing, a total of 32 PTAs had been notified to GATT/WTO 
prior to 1990 and were still in force.  EC was a participant to 16 of these arrangements.  The 
New Regionalism saw the PTAs form with vengeance with their number rising to a 
staggering 172 by early 2002.  EC remained a major player in the game with membership in 
33 additional arrangements. 
  To be sure the EC PTAs have not been confined to developed countries.  EC has 
made a conscious effort to forge preferential trade arrangements with developing countries 
as well.  Thus, it maintains special economic relations with its 12 developing Mediterranean 
neighbors, namely, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, 
Mauritania, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. Recently, it has also 
forged FTAs with some far away trading partners, notably Chile and Mexico in Latin 
America and South Africa in Africa.  EC also maintains a complex web of one-way trade 
preference to all developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
and to a large number of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries under the 
so-called Lomé Convention, recently succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement. 
  In this paper, I offer an overview and qualitative assessment of the EC preferential 
trade arrangements with developing countries.  My main conclusion is that beyond the 
obvious rent transfers accompanying such preferences, a definite positive impact of these arrangements on developing countries is difficult to detect.  To some degree, given the 
multi-layered European arrangements, it is not entirely clear what these preferences have 
meant.  Indeed, preferences to one set of developing countries have probably come at the 
expense of another.  The preferences may have also reduced pressures for trade 
liberalization within the preference-receiving countries thereby undermining the internal 
policy reform that could have promoted faster expansion of trade and possibly growth.   
Therefore, on balance, developing countries as a group will benefit more from a less 
discriminatory approach centered on the forthcoming Doha Round with the least developed 
countries assisted through direct aid. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I offer an overview of the EC 
arrangements, emphasizing its multi-layered nature.  Here I build on the excellent work of 
Sapir (1998).  In Section 3, I discuss briefly EC FTAs with developing countries and in 
Section 4, its non-reciprocal trade preferences including the recent “Everything but Arms” 
initiative.  In Section 5, I conclude the paper. 
2  The Multi-layered EC Arrangements 
We can distinguish at least seven different layers of EC integration.  While I will 
discuss in greater detail the layers relevant directly to developing countries in the following 
section, here I focus on providing an overview.  The classification below proceeds from the 
deepest to shallowest integration. 
1.  European Union (EU): The 15 EU members are characterized by the deepest 
integration with a common external tariff, common agricultural policy, 
common competition policy and common basic rules governing four basic 
freedoms: movement of goods, services, capital and persons.  Citizens of all 15 members have the right to move freely throughout the EU—to live, work, set 
up business, invest or buy real estate.  The majority of the EU members now 
also use a single currency, Euro.  
2.  European Economic Area (EEA): The Agreement on European Economic Area 
extends the Single Market of the EU to three out of the four European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA) members, namely Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein.
1 
There are two main differences between EU and EEA.  EU is a customs union 
with a common external tariff whereas EEA is a free trade area with each 
member maintaining its own separate tariff (EU enters EEA as a single entity).  
In addition, the EU common agricultural policy does not extend to EEA.   
Altogether EEA constituted a market of approximately 380 million consumers 
and accounted for almost 18 % of world imports and 20 % of world exports 
(excluding intra-EEA trade) in 2000. 
3. Customs  Unions: EU has agreements in place for the formation of customs 
unions, albeit in industrial products only, with Andorra, Cyprus, Malta and 
Turkey.  These are currently at various stages of integration.  From the 
available details, only the agreement with Turkey is in the final stages of 
implementation.  The agreement with Andorra came into force in 1991 though 
it was notified to WTO only recently in 1998.  The first generation association 
agreements with Malta and Cyprus, which included provisions for the 
establishment of customs unions and were concluded in the early 1970s, were 
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 notified to GATT in 1971 and 1973, respectively.  But these do not seem to 
have resulted in the establishment of customs unions to-date.  A new agreement 
with Cyprus is in the works and is expected to be signed by the end of 2002. 
4.  Free Trade Areas:  EU has a very large number of FTA arrangements, which 
are at various stages of implementation.  These include the Europe Agreements 
with the eastern and central European countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, 
Morocco and Jordan and free trade areas with Switzerland, Denmark, Iceland, 
Mexico and Chile.
2 
5. Mediterranean  Partnerships: EU has a special relationship with its 12 
Mediterranean partners located in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.   
Among these are the three Maghreb partners, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; 
six Mashreq partners, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon 
and Syria; and Turkey, Cyprus and Malta.  The so-called Barcelona Process, 
launched in 1995, governs the current EU-Mediterranean relations.  A key goal 
of this process is the establishment of a WTO consistent Euro-Mediterranean 
free-trade area by 2010.  This is to be achieved through a series of bilateral 
agreements involving EU and the 12 Mediterranean partners.  So far, EU has 
concluded Association Agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan and 
Egypt.  An interim agreement has also been signed with the Palestinian 
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 Authority while negotiations are still under way with Lebanon, Algeria and 
Syria.  Reference to customs unions with Turkey, Malta and Cyprus has 
already been made. 
6. ACP  Preferences: EU maintains one-way trade preferences for seventy-one 
countries spread over Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.  Because 
these preferences are neither available to all developing countries nor restricted 
to just least developed countries, they violate WTO rules and granted under 
waivers by other WTO members. 
7. GSP  Preferences:  Additionally, EU offers trade preferences under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) of the Enabling Clause of WTO.  As 
a part of its GSP program, it also undertook the recent “Everything but Arms” 
initiative aimed at the least developed countries.  Broadly speaking, for 
countries that are not least developed countries, GSP preference margin and 
commodity coverage are narrower than those offered under ACP.  As such, for 
ACP countries, GSP offers little extra benefit. 
As Sapir (1998) reminded us, an implication of these layers of arrangements is that the 
EU Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs apply uniformly to only six countries today: 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the United States.  Though zero MFN 
duties in EU on more than one fifth of the items has an ameliorating effect on the resulting 
trade diversion, in products of potential comparative advantage of developing countries, the 
impact may still be large.  Given the EU integration with many richer countries is deeper, 
developing countries may suffer a loss of market access despite the presence of preferences in their favor.  Finally, some developing countries face discrimination on account of deeper 
preferences to others.  
3  EU Preferences Involving Developing Countries 
In the previous section, I have identified three sets of EU arrangements targeted 
specifically to developing countries: arrangements pertaining to the Mediterranean partners; 
ACP preferences under the Lomé Convention; and GSP that are applicable to all developing 
countries.
3  In the following, I consider each of these in greater detail. 
3.1  Relations with Mediterranean Partners 
Bilateral agreements between EC and its Mediterranean partners have existed since 
the 1960s.  But the 1973 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors followed by the oil 
embargo led to renewed efforts for improved cooperation.  EC signed cooperation 
agreements with three Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) in 1976 and with 
four Mashreq countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria) in 1977. There were two key 
provisions in the agreements: trade preference and direct aid.  The agreements more or less 
governed the relations between EC and the Mediterranean partners until 1996. 
The resurgence of regionalism during 1990s and political developments including the 
end of the East-West conflict led EC to make renewed efforts for strengthening its ties with 
the Mediterranean states.  The outcome was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at 
the 1995 Barcelona Conference.  The Conference drew a comprehensive agenda aimed at 
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 promoting partnership between EU and the 12 Mediterranean states in three areas: political 
and security area, economic and financial area; and social, cultural and human area.  Within 
the economic and financial partnership, two key objectives were identified: (i) creation of an 
EU-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010 and (ii) expansion of the EU financial 
assistance to ε4.685 billion over the period 1995-99. 
The EU-Mediterranean free trade area is to be created by 2010 through bilateral free 
trade areas between EU and its Mediterranean partners on the one hand and similar 
arrangements among the latter.  So far EU has signed the Association Agreements that 
include free trade area as one of the provisions with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt 
and Algeria.  Agreements with the last two of these countries have not been ratified so far, 
however.  There also appears to be little progress towards free trade areas between the 
Mediterranean states themselves. 
3.2 ACP  Preferences 
Seventy-one countries, spread over Africa, Caribbean and Pacific regions, receive 
one-way trade preferences from EC under the Lomé Convention.  The beneficiaries include 
forty-seven countries from south of the Sahara in Africa, sixteen island nations of the 
Caribbean, and eight islands from the Pacific.  Thirty-nine of the ACP countries are 
classified as the least developed countries by the United Nations. 
The origins of the EU-ACP cooperation can be traced back to the Treaty Of Rome 
signed in 1957, which expressed commitment to contribute to the prosperity of the colonies 
and overseas countries with historical ties with the EC member states and proposed the 
creation of the European Development Fund (EDF) for this purpose.  Subsequently, this 
provision culminated in the Yaounde I (1963-69) and Yaounde II (1969-75) agreements between EC and ACP countries under which bulk of the EDF funds were pledged to 
French-speaking Africa to build infrastructure.   
Accession of the United Kingdom to EC in 1973 led to the signing of a more far 
reaching agreement, Lomé I (1975-80), between 46 ACP and the EC member states.  The 
agreement introduced trade preferences for most ACP exports to EC markets.  Additionally, 
the UK desire to bring its special trade preferences for bananas and sugar under the EC 
umbrella resulted in separate trading 'protocols' on sugar, bananas, and beef and veal.  The 
trade preferences and the protocols became integral parts of the successive Lomé 
Conventions, Lomé II (1980-85), Lomé III (1985-90) and Lomé IV (1990-2000).  
The banana protocol gives duty-free entry for specific quotas of bananas into the EU 
market.  Several small island Caribbean states have been among the main beneficiaries of 
the quotas.  Under the sugar protocol, EC annually buys a fixed quantity of sugar from ACP 
producers at its internal sugar price.  Among the major beneficiaries of this arrangement are 
Mauritius, Fiji, Guyana and Barbados.  Under the beef and veal protocol, EC refunds 90 per 
cent of tax normally paid on beef imports from several ACP countries.  This has been 
especially beneficial to Southern African exporters.  
Trade preferences in the Lomé Convention cover 99 percent of the industrial products 
of ACP countries without quantitative limits.  This is superior to the preferences under GSP 
described below.  In the case of 39 least developed countries, the recent “Everything but 
Arms” initiative (see below) supersedes the ACP preferences, however. The agreement also 
consists of a major aid component through the EDB, which allocates funds amounting to ε4 
to 6 billion every five-year period. The scope of the Lomé Convention is a far wider than trade preferences and aid.  
Lomé IV especially widened the agenda of the agreement, introducing even human rights as 
an ‘essential element’ of cooperation, meaning that any violations could lead to a partial or 
total suspension of aid by EU.  It also introduced environmental considerations through a 
‘protocol’ that allowed the tapping of the eighth EDF budget (1995-2000) fro the 
preservation of rainforests in the ACP member countries. 
With Lomé IV having expired, the Cotonou Agreement has recently replaced it.  This 
is a 20-year agreement, resting on five pillars: a comprehensive political dimension, 
participatory approaches, a strengthened focus on poverty reduction, a new framework for 
economic and trade cooperation and a reform of financial cooperation.  Some of the detailed 
provisions illustrate further the wide reach of the agreement: respect for human rights and 
democratic principles; a new specific procedure to be launched in serious cases of 
corruption; consultation of civil society on the economic, social and institutional reforms 
and policies to be supported by EC; an integrated approach to poverty reduction centered on 
economic development, social and human development and regional cooperation and 
integration; a process to establish new trading arrangements that will pursue trade 
liberalization between the parties; cooperation in trade related areas such as competition 
policy, intellectual property, trade and environment and trade and labor; and the channeling 
of EDF funds through two instruments—one envelope for providing grants and one for 
providing risk capital and loans to the private sector. 
Under the agreement, trade relations between EU and ACP partners are to undergo a 
major overhaul.  During 2000-07, which is regarded as the preparatory period, the current 
regime with its preferences and the protocols on sugar, banana, and beef and veal are to be maintained in some modified form.  In parallel, countries other than the least developed 
countries are to negotiate economic cooperation agreements including a GATT Article 
XXIV compatible bilateral free trade area with EU.  This means that the current one-way 
trade preferences by EU will be replaced by reciprocal preferences more or less as in the 
case of the Mediterranean partners.  The new arrangements are to enter into force latest by 
January 1, 2008 with transition to a full FTA spread over at least 12 years. 
3.3  Generalized System of Preferences 
The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), held in 
1964, considered possible ways to promote preferential treatment to goods exported by 
developing countries.  In 1968, it recommended the creation of the “Generalized System of 
Tariff Preferences” under which developed countries will grant autonomous tariff 
preferences to developing countries.  Because such preferences would be in violation of the 
Most Favored Nation principle of the GATT Article I, they required a waiver.  This was 
granted by the GATT Contracting Parties through the “Enabling Clause”” adopted in 1971 
for a ten-year period and renewed in 1979 for an indefinite period. 
Under the Enabling Clause, trade preferences have to be non-discriminatory, non-
reciprocal and autonomous.  No discrimination across developing countries is permitted 
except in favor of the least developed countries.  Preferences must also be one-way meaning 
that they must not require beneficiary countries to grant reciprocal preferences.  Finally, the 
preferences cannot be a part of a contractual agreement with the recipient countries.  Thus, 
GSP preferences are distinct from the ACP preferences, which are contractual and require a 
GATT waiver distinct from the one available under the Enabling Clause. EC was the first to implement a GSP scheme in 1971.  Back then, the preferences 
were characterized by quotas and ceiling for individual products and countries.  But since 
1995, EU has done away with quotas and replaced them with tariff preferences that vary 
according to the sensitivity of products.  Currently, EU maintains five different GSP 
arrangements: general arrangements, special incentives arrangements for the protection of 
labor rights, special incentives arrangements for the protection of the environment, special 
arrangements for the least developed countries, and special arrangements to combat drug 
production and trafficking.  These are described below in detail. 
3.3.1 General  Arrangements 
The preferences under general arrangements are available to all developing countries 
including China, which has chosen not to join the Group of 77, as also the transition 
economies.  Of the total of 10,300 products, 2,100 products face zero duties in EU.  Of the 
remaining 8,200 products, approximately 7,000 are subject to preferences under general 
arrangements.
4  Of these, 3,300 are classified as non-sensitive and 3,700 as sensitive.  Under 
the general arrangements, EU grants duty free access on non-sensitive products and partial 
tariff preferences on sensitive products. Sensitive products are defined as those requiring 
higher border protection.  This definition automatically rules out duty free access in products 
with high tariff duties.  Given that high duties typically apply to products such as textiles 
and apparel and footwear in which developing countries have a comparative advantage, this 
rule introduces a negative correlation between the margin of preferences and the ability of 
developing countries to export.  
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For a product with 14 percent duty, this amounts to a 25 percent preference margin.  A 
major exception to the rule is textiles and clothing for which the flat-preference rule is 
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attractive for exporters to put together the paper work. 
Based on certain criteria, a country may be excluded from GSP altogether or 
graduated from specific products.  Two criteria are applied for complete exclusion.  First, 
the World Bank classifies the country as a high-income country for three consecutive years.  
Second, a development index, which measures a country’s industrial development and 
participation in international trade relative to EU, attains a pre-specified value.  Both criteria 
must be satisfied. 
Sometimes, even if a country is not excluded from GSP entirely, it can be graduated 
from GSP privileges in specific sectors.  The graduation is based on achieving a certain 
degree of competitiveness in the sector.  Graduation may take place under one of the two 
mechanisms: a lion’s share clause and a graduation mechanism.  The former applies if the 
EU imports of a product from a beneficiary country reach 25 percent of the combined 
imports from all beneficiary countries.  The graduation mechanism, on the other hand, is 
based on the degree of specialization of the beneficiary country.  I sector graduates if it 
reaches a certain threshold.  In turn, the threshold is higher the lower the level of 
development.  3.3.2  Special Arrangements under Environmental and Social Clauses 
These arrangements necessarily apply to sensitive products only since the other 
products already come duty free under the general arrangements.  In the case of textiles and 
clothing, an additional 20 percent preference is available under the arrangements.  For 
products receiving the flat preference of 3.5 percentage points under general arrangements, 
the extra preference under special arrangements is 5 percentage points. 
The special incentive arrangements under the social clause are available to countries 
complying with the so-called “core labor standards.”  These standards are laid down in the 
ILO Conventions No 29 and No 105 on the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, No 
87 and No 98 on the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, No 100 and No 111 on the elimination of discrimination in 
employment and occupation, and No 138 and No 182 on the abolition of child labour.  The 
request for preferences under these arrangements by a country must be accompanied by a 
description of laws incorporating the substance of the eight ILO conventions and the 
measures taken to implement these laws.  Ratification of the conventions is not required as a 
pre-condition for qualification, however. 
The special incentive arrangements under the environmental clause are available to 
countries complying with international standards on forest management, specifically, the 
standards of the International Tropical Timber Convention. Preferences under the 
arrangements apply to products of the tropical forest included as sensitive products in the 
general arrangements. 3.3.3  Special Arrangements for the Least Developed Countries: EBA Initiative 
Countries classified by the United Nations as the Least Developed Countries have 
always enjoyed more extensive preferences than other developing countries.  Currently, 
there are 49 such countries.  Following the adoption of the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) 
initiative in February 2001, with three important exceptions (plus arms and ammunition) all 
products from these countries can now enter duty free into the European Union.  The 
initiative essentially added the approximately 10 percent of the tariff lines representing 
agricultural products that were not included previously.  The three excluded products are 
bananas, rice and sugar.  They are to be given unlimited duty free access starting January 
2006, July 2009 and September 2009, respectively.  Currently, two of the products, rice and 
sugar, are subject to limited tariff-free quotas, which are to be increased annually. 
3.3.4  Special Arrangements Aimed at Combating Drug Production and Trafficking 
As an incentive to fight drug production and trafficking, EC introduced duty free 
access to certain products originating in the Andean Community.  Subsequently, the 
arrangement has been extended to Venezuela, the Central American Common Market 
(Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador), Panama, and most recently 
Pakistan. 
Though the preferences under this arrangement are naturally available to countries 
with drug production and trafficking only, monitoring is not limited to the beneficiary 
country's efforts in combating drug production and trafficking.  Instead, the latter are also 
evaluated for their respect and promotion of core labour standards, as well as their 
environmental policy, particularly with respect to the management of tropical forests. 4  Evaluation of the EU Web of Preferences 
The EU integration can be viewed as consisting of three broad layers: the core EU with 
its common external tariff and the single market initiative, free trade area involving 
reciprocal trade preferences and one-way trade preferences applying to developing 
countries.  Of these, the first one is non-controversial.  EU is an effort to create something 
akin to the United States of America and has been a positive force for generating economic 
prosperity for its member states. 
The remaining two layers are more controversial, however, and require somewhat 
closer scrutiny. 
4.1  Free Trade Areas 
The subject of free trade areas remains controversial even among pro-free-trade 
economists.  While some argue that these arrangements are essentially a move towards free 
trade, others note that being discriminatory, they need not bring the efficiency benefits 
usually associated with freer trade and may also undermine the multilateral freeing of trade.  
The controversy on the “static” efficiency effects revolves around the Vinerian concepts of 
“trade creation” and “trade diversion” while that on regional versus multilateral free trade is 
cast in terms of Bhagwati’s “dynamic” time-path question of whether PTAs are building 
blocks or stumbling blocks of global free trade. 
While a detailed review of this debate is beyond the scope of the present paper, four 
important concerns of the advocates of the multilateral approach, among whom I count myself, may be noted.
5  First, trade diversion remains a serious concern of those advocating 
the multilateral approach.  Trade diversion refers to the fact that tariff preference to a trading 
partner makes the partner’s supply more competitive relative to that coming from a more 
efficient outside supplier.  This diverts imports from the latter to the former.
6  The change is 
not only globally inefficient but also leads to adverse welfare effects on those outside the 
union.  Even when trade creation effects are present and dominate so that the union as a 
whole improves its welfare, outside countries are hurt due to whatever trade diversion does 
take place.  Thus, even a PTA in which trade creation effects dominate is not benign.
7 
Second, PTAs can lead to increased protection against outside countries and, thus, turn 
into stumbling blocks of multilateral liberalization.  Bhagwati (1993) first noted this 
possibility arguing that even when a PTA is initially trade creating, pressures to protect the 
domestic industry may lead to increased protection against the outside countries and 
eventually turn trade creation into trade diversion.  As the partner begins to undermine the 
inefficient domestic firms following the tariff preference, the latter may seek protection 
through increased barriers against outside partners.  The increase in such barriers may take 
the form of higher tariffs when outside tariffs are not WTO bound and of anti-dumping 
when tariffs are bound.  Some evidence supporting this phenomenon has been documented 
in Panagariya (1999). 
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7 That trade diversion effects do accompany PTAs has been documented in a variety of studies.  
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 Third, as a corollary of the previous point, the expectations to forge PTAs have led to a 
slowdown of unilateral, nondiscriminatory liberalization.  Much of this liberalization in 
recent years has taken place in Asia, which has more or less stayed away from the 
preferential trade arrangements.  In contrast, Latin America, which has chosen to go the 
PTA route during 1990s, has essentially lost the momentum for nondiscriminatory, 
unilateral liberalization it had acquired during 1980s.  The essential point here is that if 
countries want to form PTAs, they can do so only if they have tariff preference to offer.  For 
instance, if Mexico were to eliminate its outside tariff, it will be in no position to conclude 
PTAs with its trading partners. 
Finally, for a considerable time to come, crisscrossing FTAs have given rise to what 
Bhagwati calls the spaghetti bowl of tariffs.  There are two sources of the spaghetti-bowl 
effect.  First, each FTA has a different transition timetable.  Therefore, until each FTA is 
fully implemented, tariff depends on the union partner from which the product is imported.  
Second, each FTA has its own rules of origin to determine whether the product was actually 
manufactured within the union before giving it the duty-free status.  Therefore, even after 
the FTAs have been fully implemented, discrimination based on the rules of origin will 
remain.   
EU, which has signed by far the maximum number of FTAs and has plans to sign many 
more, has contributed most significantly to this spaghetti-bowl effect.  Indeed, the problem 
has been compounded by its multi-layered one-way trade preferences under GSP, ACP and 
other arrangements.  As mentioned earlier, Sapir (1998) has made the dramatic point that the 
EU MFN tariff applies to only six countries today.  Additionally, EU FTAs have often excluded agriculture where the scope for trade creation through the elimination of inefficient 
suppliers is perhaps the largest! 
4.2 One-way  Preferences 
For approximately four decades, developing countries have asked for and received 
considerable preferential access to developed country markets.  EU has clearly contributed 
its share towards such market access.  Yet, the preferences can hardly claim to have 
generated significant successes.  For example, a ‘green paper’ published in 1997 by the 
European Commission as a preparatory step towards the 1998 talks aimed at a new 
agreement that would succeed Lomé IV offered a grim assessment.  Thus, the share of ACP 
countries in the EU market had declined from 6.7 percent in 1976 to 3 percent in 1998.  
Merely 10 products accounted for 60 percent of the total ACP exports to EU.  Per-capita 
GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by only 0.4 percent per-annum compared with 2.3 percent 
for all developing countries from 1962 to 1992.  At most, a handful of nations—Ivory Coast, 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe and Jamaica—have benefited perceptibly from the preferences. 
The empirical literature supports the broad conclusion that trade preferences have had 
little beneficial impact beyond the obvious rent transfer accompanying duty-free entry of 
goods.
8  For example, Whalley (1990, p. 1319) concludes thus in his assessment of the 
impact of the special and differential treatment to developing countries under GATT:  
“The paper suggests that available empirical studies, limited as they are, seem to point 
to the conclusion that special and differential treatment has had only a marginal effect 
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(1989), MacPhee and Oguledo (1991) and Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian (2002). 
 on country economic performance, especially through GSP.  And in the more rapidly 
growing economies, such as Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and others, there is little evidence 
that special and differential treatment has played much of a role in their strong 
performance. 
  There are many reasons why trade preferences may have had a limited impact on the 
exports of the beneficiary countries.  Among them, the following are especially important. 
Adverse Impact on the Beneficiary-Country Liberalization  
The preferences discourage liberalization within the beneficiary countries 
themselves.  Hudec (1987) noted this many years ago when he wrote, “the non-reciprocity 
doctrine tends to remove the major incentive that [developing country] export industries 
have...for opposing protectionist trade policies at home.”  Once exporters have achieved 
free access to the markets of major trading partners, their incentive for using internal 
liberalization as an instrument of encouraging the partner to open its market disappears.  
Alternatively, if exporters fear losing GSP status if exports cross a certain threshold, they 
may be more accommodating of protectionist policies at home. 
Recent econometric research by Ozden and Reinhardt (2002) supports this 
hypothesis. These authors analyze a panel dataset of annual observations on each of the 154 
developing countries ever eligible for the United States GSP program, starting in the year of 
first eligibility (mostly 1976) and continuing through 2000.  Comparing those countries 
remaining on GSP to those dropped, they find that the countries dropped from the program 
open their markets substantially.   
Specifically, according to their quantitative estimates, the removal from GSP 
program has the effect of boosting a developing country's imports by 8 percent of its GDP, cutting its average nominal tariff by 4 percentage points, and reducing the duties it collects 
by about 1.6 percent of the value of its trade.  These findings control for a wide variety of 
confounds (like geography, income, GDP size, and global liberalization trends), and the 
response rises slightly after correction for the endogeneity of GSP. 
Ozden and Reinhardt offer the example of Chile, whose trade liberalization had 
come to a standstill by the late 1980s.  In 1988, it was dropped from the US GSP program in 
1988 (for human and worker rights violations).  Its finance minister immediately announced 
a reduction in Chile's average nominal tariff from 20 to 15 percent; his explicitly stated 
rationale being to compensate for its exporters' loss of competitiveness in the US market by 
defraying their input costs. 
Product Selectivity, Discrimination Across Beneficiary Countries and Side 
Conditions 
  Under the original conception, GSP preferences were to cover all products 
(“generalized”), be non-discriminatory across developing countries except if the 
discrimination was in favor of the Least Developed Countries, and preclude reciprocal 
concessions from developing countries.  But given the “permissive” rather than 
“mandatory” nature of the Enabling Clause, developed countries have often been able to 
violate this conception along all three dimensions without risk of a challenge in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body.  Thus, they frequently exclude precisely those products in which 
developing countries have comparative advantage, “graduate” a country out of the 
preference for a product just as it begins to achieve significant success as an exporter, and 
attach side conditions that amount to reciprocal concessions from developing countries.  Let 
me elaborate on each of these violations.   Often the scope of GSP has been limited in precisely those products in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage.  It was noted above that EU gives 
very limited preference on textiles and clothing.  More importantly, it has maintained 
strict import quotas on the imports of these products from all significant suppliers under 
the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA).  Indeed, it was not until developing countries opted 
for reciprocal bargains in the Uruguay Round that EU and other developed countries 
agreed to dismantle the MFA regime.
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  This point applies even more forcefully to agricultural exports.  Until recently, 
agricultural products have remained virtually entirely out of the EU GSP schemes.  Only 
recently, the EBA initiative, aimed exclusively at the Least Developed Countries, attempted 
to bring them into the GSP net.  But even this attempt seems to have more symbolic than 
real value.  Thus, three major items of potential interest, rice, banana and sugar, have been 
left out of the EBA net.  What is surprising is that the publicity surrounding the EBA 
initiative notwithstanding, the potential for agricultural exports from the least developed 
countries is minimal.  This is evident from the magnitudes of agricultural exports of the 
Least Developed Countries shown in Table 1.  For example, given the paltry 2,000 tons of 
annual rice exports to EU, it is difficult to understand the rationale against granting 
immediate quota-free entry of that product to the Least Developed Countries.  A similar 
point also applies to sugar. 
                                                 
9 Even as the MFA and other quantitative restrictions are dismantled, threats of anti-dumping and 
other contingent protection measures loom large.  Irrespective of whether or not such threats are 
carried out and when carried out whether or not they succeed, their mere presence may have a lasting 
effect on the exporters.  Thus, for example, though the recent EU attempts to impose AD duties on 
unbleached cotton imports from five emerging markets failed, the attempt itself led to considerable 
disruption of markets for the developing country-exporters who were so targeted.   Discrimination across developing countries other than that favoring the Least 
Developed Countries has also become a feature of the current preference regime.   Within 
the GSP, this is accomplished by graduating countries from products in which they achieve 
success as also by invoking side conditions (see below).  Outside the GSP, FTAs are another 
way to discriminate.  Finally, the EU ACP preferences and the U.S. Caribbean Basin 
Initiative and recent Africa Growth and Opportunity Act all introduce discrimination across 
developing countries that goes beyond the Least Developed Countries.  
Finally, despite the original conception of GSP as unilateral, autonomous 
preferences, they have been effectively turned into reciprocal, contractual preferences 
through side conditions.  Thus, with all the special agendas relating to labor, environment 
and drug production and trafficking attached to the grant of any significant preferences 
under GSP, it is difficult to see regard these preferences as non-reciprocal or even non-
contractual.   
Moreover, these side conditions introduce a certain element of uncertainty for 
exporters: the benefit may be withdrawn any time on the pretext that a specific standard is 
not being fulfilled.  In particular, in the United States, domestic lobbies have made free use 
of these conditions to pursue their favorite goals.  As an example, in April 1992, the U.S. 
terminated India’s GSP privileges on $60 million worth of exports of pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals on the pretext that the country did not have adequate intellectual property 
protection. 
Rules of Origin 
  To take advantage of a tariff preference, an exporting country must satisfy certain 
“rules of origin” to substantiate the claim that it indeed produced the good rather than import it from another one excluded from GSP privileges.  The commonest such rule makes the 
preference contingent on a minimum valued addition to the product within the exporting 
country.  This requirement can be a major deterrent since many small and poor countries are 
able to perform only simple assembly operations.  And even if the requirement is not 
prohibitive initially, developed countries have been known to raise it after a country 
successfully penetrates their markets. 
Thus, drawing on Bovard (1991), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001, p. 391) offer the 
following interesting example.  In 1983, under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, initially the 
U.S. granted tariff preferences on ethanol to the beneficiary countries provided it had a 35 
percent local value content.  Investments by companies in Jamaica and Costa Rica to 
convert surplus European wine into ethanol allowed them to reach the 35 percent local value 
content.  Two years later, with production and exports doing well, the U.S. raised the local 
value content requirement to 70 percent.  This was an impossible standard for the Caribbean 
producers to meet. 
In one important respect, the rules of origin introduce an element of discrimination 
between small and poor developing countries and their richer and larger counterparts.  Many 
small, poor economies are able to perform only simple assembly operations so that they may 
not be able to satisfy the rules of origin.  In contrast, richer, larger developing countries may 
succeed in satisfying these rules and better able to take advantage of the preference.   
  Adverse Impact on the Developed Country Liberalization 
  Trade preferences have also ended up turning into a defense against genuine, 
multilateral liberalization by developed countries in products of potential comparative 
advantage of developing countries.  By offering special side deals to specific groups of countries through the preferences, they have effectively succeeded in maintaining the MFA 
for several decades as well as retain high tariffs on textiles and apparel, footwear and 
fisheries. 
  The negotiating power conferred by this instrument on developed countries was 
demonstrated most recently at Doha with these countries successfully breaking up the united 
front offered by a group of developing countries against the inclusion of the Singapore 
issues into the Doha agenda.  The U.S. decision to go along with the waiver in favor of the 
Cotonou Agreement, sought by the African countries to preserve the ACP preferences, 
substantially muted the African opposition to the Singapore issues.  In this vein, there 
remains the danger that developed countries may succeed in using the preferences to 
resist pressures for genuine liberalization of sectors subject to peak tariffs in the Doha 
Round of negotiations.   
5 Concluding  remarks 
This paper has provided a unified discussion of the EC/EU trade relations with 
developing countries.  The focus has been on preferential trade intended to promote closer 
ties with these countries.  In the process, I have noted that the EC integration schemes have 
been multi-layered such that developing countries may have suffered discrimination despite 
the special schemes in their favor because the special schemes offered others are sweeter.  
As EU forges closer and closer ties with its European partners, developing countries are 
bound to suffer from trade diversion.  Some developing countries, particularly the 
Mediterranean and ACP countries, may be compensated through preferences for themselves 
but that will then necessarily come at the expense of other developing countries in, say, 
Asia. I have also argued that one-way preferences such as those under GSP have failed to 
fulfill the objectives for which they had been intended.  Because these preferential schemes 
are offered as privileges not subject to genuine WTO discipline, they can be withdrawn any 
time on one of the many pretexts that have been built into them.  This deters potential 
entrepreneurs from making the necessary investments.  The point is well illustrated in the 
following excerpt from a letter to the Financial Times (June 6, 2002) by Amar Hamoudi of 
the Center for Global Development regarding the Africa Growth and Opportunity (AGOA) 
Act. 
“Take the recent case where a consortium of US fruit producers asked the Bush 
administration to suspend South Africa's Agoa benefits on canned pears, arguing that 
the expansion of the industry in South Africa threatened to put a handful of Americans 
out of work. Fruit producers in South Africa protested that Agoa did not induce them to 
expand production, since the necessary investments were too risky given that the 
benefits granted by Agoa can be revoked at any time. Producers in Africa can expect 
that any time they succeed in taking true advantage of Agoa, some special interest 
group in the US will demand that the benefits be rescinded.” 
The shortcoming of preferential trade practices, discussed principally in the context of 
the EU schemes, are of course applicable to all such schemes and therefore pose greater 
threat to the interests of developing countries than might seem from the focus on EU alone.  
Therefore, it is more important than ever to successfully complete the Doha round of 
negotiations, bringing trade barriers down in developed and developing countries on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.  Such liberalization will not only promote genuine free trade but 
also remove the uncertainty associated with one-way trade preferences, reduce the existing discrimination across countries and help clean up the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon that now 
characterizes the trading system. In this regard, mention may be made of the call Jagdish 
Bhagwati and I have made (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2001) for a Jubilee 2010 movement 
aimed at the removal of the remaining restrictions on industrial products in developed 
countries.   
  
Table 1: Least Developed Country Exports 
(Average for 1996-98 in 000 tons) 
 
   World  ASEAN/SAARC  EU15 
        
Cereals   275  151  28 
 Rice  68  70  2 
Oilseeds   827  76  467 
Livestock and Meat    1.815  200  2 
Dairy Produce    3  1  0 
Fruit & Vegetables    586  561  77 
Sugar   423  25  216** 
Tropical (coffee/cocoa/bananas…) 942  166  517 
 Bananas  21  0  18 
Wine & Vermouth    0  0  0 
Food Preparations    27  3  1 
Alcoholic Drinks    6  0  4 
Soft Drinks/Fruits Juices    3  2  0 
 
**Including 134,000 tons of molasses 
 
Source: European Commission (undated) 
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